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Abstract: This article briefly introduces the privity rule and its application in Malaysia 
which has created difficulties in relation to contracts made for the benefit of third parties. This 
article then investigates how Malaysian courts circumvent the privity rule to ensure that justice 
prevails. The mechanisms examined include among others agency, trust, tort and estoppel. This 
article argues that the application of these mechanisms rule are not adequate to resolve the 
difficulties caused by the privity rule and concludes that a statutory reform to create third party 
rights in contract law is required. 
1. Introduction 
 
The privity rule which stipulates that no benefit can be conferred to a third party who is not a party to the contract 
has long been regarded as “an anachronistic shortcoming that has for many years been regarded as a reproach to 
English private law”.1 The problems created by the privity rule which prevent third parties from enforcing a 
contract made for their benefit are widespread.2 Particularly, the privity rule denies the contracting parties from 
fulfilling their intention to benefit a third party. A number of the Commonwealth countries had undertaken 
statutory reform of the privity rule and recognised third party rights in contract law. The notable reform was that 
undertaken by the English Parliament which resulted in the enactment of Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999.3 Besides, the High Court in Australia and the Supreme Court in Canada had also created exceptions to the 
privity rule.  
In Malaysia, the privity rule is deeply entrenched in the legal system. The Malaysian courts had applied the 
doctrine in a variety of cases involving variety of situations. In the recent case of Razshah Enterprise Sdn Bhd v 
Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd,4 Abdul Malik Ishak JCA in the Court of Appeal5 stated that: 
 
Our Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136) has no express provision pertaining to the doctrine of privity 
of contract. In fact, Kepong Prospecting gives the gloom picture that the doctrine still applies in 
Malaysia. Indeed Mohamed Dzaiddin J (who later rose to be the Chief Justice of Malaysia) 
relied on Kepong Prospecting and aptly said in Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd v Suruhanjaya 
Pelabuhan Pulau Pinang & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 269, at p 271: 
It is clear that the English doctrine of privity of contract applies to our law of contract.6 
 
In Razshah Enterprise, the defendant company guaranteed a loan taken by one of its directors from the 
plaintiff. The director (borrower) failed to pay for the loan and the plaintiff sued the defendant to enforce the 
guarantee. The defendant sought to counterclaim the plaintiff’s action based on two letters7 written by the plaintiff 
to the director (borrower). The plaintiff attempted to strike out the counterclaim. One of the arguments relied by 
the plaintiff was that the defendant had no locus standi to bring the counterclaim as it was not a party to the loan 
agreement. The Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff’s argument because the agreement involved was a guarantee 
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 As per Lord Diplock in Swain v Law Society  [1983] 1 AC 598, at 611. 
2
 The list of difficulties created by the privity of contract rule is well discussed in England, Law Reform Commission’s Report 
No 242, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (1996). In Malaysia, these difficulties have been 
discussed in Edwin, Clarence, “Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties – Will Our Common Law See the Demise of Privity 
of Contract?” [2000] 4 Malayan Law Journal i-xxi. 
3
 Other recent reforms include the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 enacted in New Zealand and the s.56 Law of Property Act 2000 
enacted in Northern Territory of Australia. 
4[2009] 2 MLJ 102. 
5In Malaysia, the highest court is the Federal Court, followed by the Court of Appeal and the High Court. 
6
 At 119 (Razshah Enterprise). 
7
 These two letters stated that the plaintiff agreed to restructure payment of the outstanding amount of the loan, reduced interest 
rates for the loan and extended the repayment due date. The plaintiff failed to comply with the changes to the term loan 
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agreement where the defendant’s liability was dependent on the amount owed by the director (borrower). Thus, the 
defendant had the locus standi to bring the counterclaim which if successful, would reduce the amount of its 
liability. 
No effort has been undertaken to reform the privity rule in Malaysia despite the many difficulties created 
by the rule. However, the Malaysian Parliament had created ac hoc exceptions to the privity rule8 throughout the 
years and there are a number of common law mechanisms available to the courts to evade the rule. The purpose of 
this article is to examine the common law mechanisms that had been utilized or referred to by the Malaysian 
courts to circumvent the privity rule and determine whether the present legal position is satisfactory. 
The common law mechanisms discussed in this article include (i) liberal construction as to who is a party to 
the contract, (ii) collateral contracts, (iii) agency, (iv) trust (v) tort or negligence, (v) estoppel and (vi) remedies for 
breach of contract. 
 
2. Difficulties Created by the Privity Rule to Contracts Made for the Benefit of 
Third Parties 
 
There are two classic cases9 which neatly illustrate the difficulties caused by the application of the privity rule to 
contracts made for the benefit of third parties. The first case discussed is Tweddle v Atkinson,10 where a contract 
was made between the plaintiff’s father and his future father-in-law (defendant) to make payments of money to the 
plaintiff upon his marriage. It was stated in the agreement that the plaintiff “has full power to sue the said parties 
in any court of law or equity for aforesaid sums hereby promised and specified.” Both the original contracting 
parties had passed away and the defendant’s administrator of estate did not fulfil the contractual obligation of 
paying a sum of money to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action to claim payment intended for him under 
the contract. The plaintiff stated that he had ratified and assented to the agreement shortly after the agreement was 
created.  
The court held that the plaintiff’s action must fail because he was not a party to the contract and 
consideration of the contract did not move from him. It is very clear that the outcome of this case was inconsistent 
with the contracting parties’ intention as evidenced by the term of the agreement allowing the plaintiff to enforce 
the contract. 
In Beswick v Beswick,11 the deceased transferred his business of a coal merchant to his nephew in return for 
the nephew’s promise that the deceased would be appointed as a consultant to the said business and after his death, 
the nephew would pay annuity to the deceased’s wife. After the death of the deceased, the nephew refused to make 
payments to the widow after making the first payment. The widow brought an action against the nephew in her 
capacity as administratrix and also in her personal capacity for specific performance of the agreement. The House 
of Lords in a unanimous decision held that the widow could not enforce the contract in her personal capacity even 
though the contract was clearly intended to benefit her because she was not privy to the contract.12  
 
3. Liberal Construction as to who is a Party to the Contract 
 
If the courts adopt a more liberal interpretation of the contract and decide that a third party acquires the status of a 
contracting party, he can then enforce the contract. In Malaysia, the determination of the issue as to who is a party 
to a contract rests generally on the participation in the formation of contract and construction of the terms of 
contract. A person who participates in the contract in any capacity other than that of the promisor and promisee is 
not considered to be a contracting party.13 The fact that the performance of the contract is intended for a third party 
is not important.14 Thus, a third party who does not participate in the formation of the contract or named as a party 
to the contract is not entitled to enforce the contract. 
                                                          
8
 Insurance Act 1996 (Act 553) involving life insurance contracts where the insured’s spouse and children are the beneficiaries, 
Road Transport Act 1987 (Act 333) involving compulsory motor insurance policy for road accidents, Civil Law Act 1956 
(Revised 1972) (Act 67) in relation to assignments, Bills of Exchange Act 1949 (Revised 1978) (Act 204) on enforceability of 
negotiable instruments by a third party and Consumer Protection Act 1999 (Act 599) for situations involving defective 
products. 
9
 These two cases had been referred to in Malaysian judicial decisions. 
10
 (1861-73) All ER 369.  
11
 [1968] AC 58. 
12
 Nonetheless, as widow in her capacity as the administratrix of the deceased’s estate was entitled to an order for specific 
performance to compel the nephew to perform his obligation under the contract.  
13Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Bhd v Personal Representatives of the Estate of Lee Lun Wah Maureen [1994] 1 MLJ 
209. 
14Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd v Foh Chong & Sons Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 CLJ 601. 
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Nonetheless, the High Court in Parimala a/p Muthusamy v Projek Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan adopted a 
very liberal approach in determining who are parties to the contract.15 In Parimala, the plaintiffs were passengers 
in a motorcar driven by the deceased along the highway at the time of accident. The deceased died on the spot 
after hitting a stray cow which had found its way to the highway through a breach in the fencing system. The 
plaintiffs claimed damages for injuries that they suffered as a result of the accident. The High Court allowed the 
plaintiffs’ claim based on the common law tort of negligence16 and breach of statutory duty.17 However, Suriyadi J 
went on to hold that there was also a breach of contract by the defendant. The moment a ticket was extracted at the 
toll gate, a contract was struck between the plaintiffs and the defendant. There was an implied warranty that the 
highway would be safe for the use of the deceased and the plaintiffs. 
Syed Alsagoff has rightly pointed out that it is difficult to understand how the plaintiffs were in a 
contractual relationship with the defendant.18 Following the facts of Parimala, the deceased who purchased the toll 
ticket was clearly one of the contracting parties. On the contrary, the plaintiffs had done nothing to indicate that 
they were parties to the contract. Neither could it be argued that the deceased and the defendant intended the 
plaintiffs to be parties to their contract. Hence, it is not surprising that there is no subsequent case which applies 
Parimala although it was referred to without disapproval in Mohamad Khalid bin Yusuf v The Datuk Bandar 
Kuching Utara.19  
It is submitted that the courts in deciding whether to elevate the status of a third party to that of a 
contracting party should take into account the contracting parties’ intention. Only if the contracting parties intend 
the third party to enjoy the status of a contracting party, should it be justified for the courts to do so. Otherwise, it 
will amount to a situation where the contracting parties are unable to determine the scope of their liability. This 
goes against one of the hallmark characteristics of a contract, to respect the freedom of contract of the contracting 
parties. 
 
4. Collateral Contracts 
 
The utility of collateral contracts in assisting the third party to evade the doctrine was acknowledged by Abdul 
Malik Ishak J in Oriental Bank Bhd v Uniphoenix Corp Bhd20 where the learned judge stated that “The collateral 
contract provides a means of avoiding the rule as to the privity of contract.”21 The third party argues that a 
collateral contract is created alongside the main contract entered into by the promisor and promisee. The parties to 
the collateral contract are the promisor and the third party. The promisor promises the third party that he will 
perform the main contract. If the promisor fails to perform the main contract, the third party is entitled to sue him 
for breach of the collateral contract. However, in order to invoke the creation of a collateral contract, the third 
party must provide consideration and prove that the promisor and himself intend to create legal relations. These 
two requirements prove to be hurdles to third parties especially in situations where they are not aware that a 
contract has been created for their benefit or that no communication passes between them. 
 
5. Agency 
 
The utilisation of the agency mechanism22 to evade the privity rule involves the promisee acting as an agent on 
behalf of the third party whom he intends to benefit when he enters into the contract with the promisor. As such, 
the third party is entitled to enforce the contract against the promisor. In The Golf Cheque Book Sdn Bhd v Nilai 
Springs Bhd,23 Gopal Sri Ram JCA stated that:  
But it is central to the doctrine of privity of contract that the parties to the contract are 
contracting on their own behalf and not as the agent of some third party, be that third party a 
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 [1997] 5 MLJ 488. ‘Projek Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan’ refers to the North-South Highway Project in English. 
16
 In Parimala, despite having knowledge that the area had experienced broken fences where animals had escaped and strayed 
on to the road and being aware of the potential dangers, the defendant had not found it fit either to take extra measures or give 
special attention to that spot to alleviate any disaster. Thus, the defendant was liable for tort of negligence for the injuries 
suffered by the plaintiffs. 
17
 The statutory duty under the tort of negligence was imposed based on the duties imposed by the Highway Authority 
Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1980, s.11(1) and the Road Transport Act 1987, s.88. 
18
 Syed Ahmad Alsagoff, Principles of the Law of Contract in Malaysia, 2nd Edition, (MLJ, 2003) at 149. 
19
 [2007] 5 MLJ 414 at 427-428. 
20
 [2005] 7 MLJ 315. 
21
 At 332 (Oriental Bank). The device of collateral contract is a well-established principle in Malaysia. It was discussed in Tan 
Swee Hoe Co Ltd v Ali Hussain Bros [1980] 2 MLJ 16; Kluang Wood Products Sdn Bhd v Hong Leong Finance Bhd [1994] 4 
CLJ 141; Foo Lian Sin v Ng Chun Lin (CA) [2006] 1 MLJ 457; Bank Bumiputra  Bhd v Malek & Joseph Au [1995] 4 MLJ 251. 
22
 Agency is governed in Part X of Contracts Act 1950 (Revised 1974) (Act 136). 
23
 [2006] 1 MLJ 554. 
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disclosed or an undisclosed principal. Because it is a well established principle that agency is an 
exception to the privity doctrine. (emphasis added)24 
 
The agency mechanism was applied in a number of cases by Malaysian courts to sidestep the privity rule.25 
For instance, in The Viva Ocean,26 a dispute arose due to the damage of a cargo. The fault was attributable to the 
shipowner who argued that it was not liable as it was not privy to the contract of carriage entered into by the cargo 
owner and the carrier. It was held by the High Court that the shipowner could be sued as the carrier entered into 
the contract as an agent on behalf of the shipowner. This was due to a clause in the contract of carriage which read 
as follows: 
IDENTITY OF CARRIER: If the ship is not owned by or chartered by demise to Dooyang Line 
Company Ltd or the line or company by or on behalf of whom this Bill of Lading is issued (as 
may be the case notwithstanding anything that appears to the contrary), this Bill of Lading shall 
take effect only as a contract with the Owner or demise Charterer as the case may be as principal 
made through the agency or said carrier or line, who acts as agent only and shall be under no 
personal liability whatsoever in respect thereof. 
 
The agency principle is also relied upon in circumstances where the third party is seeking to rely on 
exclusion clauses found in contracts to which he is not privy to. In Ramachandran a/l Mayandy v Abdul Rhaman 
bin Ambok,27 Abdul Malik Ishak J in explaining the liability of a principal for the tortious act of its agents stated 
that the principal can rely on the exclusion clause in a contract entered into by the agent which limits the tortious 
liability of the agent as decided in Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones.28 In Midland Silicones, Lord Reid held that a 
third party can rely on an exclusion clause in a contract to which he is not a party to if the following requirements 
are satisfied:  
(first) the bill of lading makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the 
provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier, 
in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, should apply to the stevedore, 
(thirdly) the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later ratification by 
the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about consideration moving from 
the stevedore were overcome.29  
 
Lord Reid’s judgment as quoted above (hereinafter referred to as Lord Reid’s principle of agency) has led 
to the use of Himalaya Clauses intended to allow third parties to a contract of carriage of goods to rely on its terms 
to defend themselves in an action brought against them. 
In ABDA Airfreight Sdn Bhd v Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia Bhd, Abdul Malik Ishak J in the addendum 
written in this case stated that: 
Where, however, the contract contemplates that the carrier will continue to have some 
responsibility for the goods after the completion of the carriage, i.e. as bailee, any immunities 
from liability conferred by the contract may operate to protect him in his capacity as bailee, and 
may extend to protect, in appropriate cases, his servants or agents (Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty 
Ltd v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd, The New York Star [1980] 3 All ER 257. 
(emphasis added)30 
 
It is unclear as to the scope of the Lord Reid’s principle of agency applicable in Malaysia. In England, the 
use of the Himalaya Clauses is limited to contracts of carriage of goods only. In Ramachandran, Abdul Malik 
Ishak J had referred to Midland Silicones without any restriction to the scope of this principle, thereby suggesting 
that it has a wider application in Malaysia, particularly, where the facts of Ramachandran did not involve any 
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 At 559 (Golf Cheque). 
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 Interschiff Schiffahrtsagentur Gmbh v Southern Star Shipping & Trading Pte Ltd. [1984] MLJ 342; The Viva Ocean [2004] 2 
AMR 284; Wong Yan Mok v Indo-Malaya Trading Co [1975] MLJ 147; Tara Rajaratnam v Datuk Jagindar Singh [1983] 2 
MLJ 127 and Anika Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd v Public Bank Bhd  [2004] 6 MLJ 268.  
26
 [2004] 2 AMR 284. This case involved imposition of burden to a third party via the principle of agency. 
27
 [1997] 4 MLJ 237, at 246. The facts of this case do not deal with reliance of third parties on an exclusion clause. 
28
 [1962] AC 446. 
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contracts of carriage of goods. Yet, this case alone could not be a good indication that Lord Reid’s principle of 
agency is applicable to all types of contracts. 
 
6. Trust 
 
The trust mechanism is one of the more popular mechanisms utilised by the Malaysian courts in circumventing the 
privity rule. The promisee acts as the trustee who enters into a contract with the promisor for a third party. If the 
promisor breaches the contract, the promisee can sue the promisor for breach of contract and recover the losses 
suffered by the third party. If the promisee fails to sue the promisor, the third party can enforce the contract against 
the promisor by joining the promisee as a defendant.31  
One of the requirements to prove the existence of a trust is to prove that there is an intention to create a 
trust (certainty of intention). It is not necessary for the settlor to use the ‘word’ trust. The settlor does not need to 
know that he is creating a trust at the time it is created as long as the effects that he intends are similar to the 
effects of a trust32 that is he intends to divest ownership in the subject matter of the trust to the beneficiary. 
However, a mere intention to benefit a third party is insufficient.33 The intention to create a trust can be expressed 
or inferred. 
In Malaysia, the courts sometimes stress on the need to find a clear express intention of the contracting 
parties to create a trust. At other times, they could easily determine the existence of an intention to create a trust 
based on the intention of the contracting parties to benefit the third party. This inconsistency is illustrated in a 
number of cases.   
In Malaysian Australian Finance Co. Ltd. v The Law Union & Rock Insurance Co Ltd,34 the applicant was 
the owner of a motor vehicle (caterpillar tractor) who entered into a hire-purchase agreement with Choong. 
Choong entered into a contract for an insurance policy with the respondent to insure the tractor against losses as 
required under the hire-purchase agreement. The insurance policy contained a clause which acknowledged that the 
applicant was the owner of the motor vehicle insured in the insurance policy and any money payable under the 
policy shall be paid to the owner. An issue arose whether the owner had the right to institute a claim in its own 
right to recover damages for the loss of the tractor against the respondent as the contract of insurance was created 
by Choong and the respondent. 
It was held that the owner was entitled to make the claim on the insurance contract. The owner’s right 
under the contract of insurance was “co-extensive” with the rights of the hirer who contracted with the respondent. 
This conclusion was reached on the basis that the owner was a party to the contract of insurance. Alternatively, if 
the owner was not a party to the contract, the trust mechanism was applicable to assist him. Mohamed Azmi J 
relied on the Halsbury’s Laws of England,35 which stated that: 
There may be a trust of a contract. If one of two contracting parties contracts expressly as trustee 
for another person, that third person can enforce the trust. A clear intention to create such a trust 
must be shown to render it enforceable. (emphasis added)36 
 
It was held that the respondent should be regarded as a trustee or agent for the owner because the insurance 
policy was created for his benefit. This conclusion was reached as the respondent had promised to pay the 
proceeds of the insurance to him directly.37 The learned judge appeared to treat a promise of direct payment to the 
third party coupled with an intention to benefit him were sufficient to create a trust. This seems to be in line with 
the old English cases such as Tomlinson v Gill,38 Gregory and Parker v Williams,39 Fletcher v Fletcher40 and 
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 Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of New York [1933] A.C. 70 (PC). 
32
 Hayton, David and Charles Mitchell, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, 12th Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2005) at 154; Martin, Jill E., Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity, 17th Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005) at 95. 
33
 Wan Azlan Ahmad and Paul Linus Andrews, Equity and Trusts in Malaysia, (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2005) at 23.  
34
 [1972] 2 MLJ 10.  
35
 3rd Edition, Vol 38 at 822. 
36
 At 12 (Malaysian Australian Finance). 
37
 At 12 (Malaysian Australian Finance). 
38
  (1756) Ambler 330. In this case, the defendant promised a widow that if she allowed him to be the administrator of her 
husband’s estate, he would pay off debts owed by the deceased. The plaintiff, one of the creditors of the deceased, was entitled 
to sue the defendant for payment of debt as the widow entered into the agreement with the defendant as a trustee for the 
creditors.  
39
 (1817) 3 Mer 582. In this case, Parker owed money both to Gregory and Williams. He agreed with Williams to assign him 
the whole of his property, if Williams would pay the debt due to Gregory. Williams failed to pay Gregory. Both Gregory and 
Parker were allowed to sue Williams for breach of contract as Parker was held to be a trustee for Gregory as a result of the 
contract between Parker and William. 
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Lloyd’s v Harper41 as the terms of the insurance policy created by the insurer and Choong never mentioned about 
the creation of a trust. The trust device was used to enable the owner to sue. A contrary view can be taken as 
Mohamed Azmi J also referred to the requirement of proving a clear intention to create a trust. There was no 
express intention to create a trust in this case but since it dealt with a contract of insurance, it may be easier to infer 
an intention to create a trust. Yet, this point was not discussed in the judgment.  
In G R Nair v Eastern Mining & Metals Co Sdn Bhd,42 a case dealing with group insurance policy intended 
to cover losses suffered due to employees’ injuries, it was held that no trust was created between the employer and 
the employees. As such, the employees had no right to enforce the insurance policy. In discussing the creation of 
an express trust, the learned judge referred to the English cases such as Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance 
Corporation of New York, Re Sinclair’s Policy43 and Green v Russell44 which held that an intention to benefit a 
third party by direct payment of proceeds of insurance policy was not sufficient in creating a trust. These English 
cases represent the current and stricter approach compared to the old English cases mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. Applying these cases to G R Nair, since there was no mention of any trust in the insurance policy, no 
trust was created.45  
On the contrary, in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Mohamed Salleh,46 Gopal Sri Ram JCA expressed the 
following view in relation to group insurance policy: 
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, under the ordinary principles that govern the law 
of trusts, any employee would be able to lodge a claim, as a beneficiary of the policy, against 
MNI. This would cause great difficulties to the insurer because it will then be faced with a 
multitude of claims. To avoid such a result, there is inserted in the relevant policy the following 
clause: 
The insurers shall be entitled to treat the insured as the absolute owner of the Policy and shall 
not be bound to recognize any equitable or other claim to or interest in the Policy. 
The effect of this clause is that the person such as the respondent cannot recover anything 
under the policy from MNI directly. However, the appellant is entitled to receive any benefit 
due to the respondent. Once received, it will hold the monies as trustee for the respondent. 
This then is what a group insurance is all about. (emphasis added)47 
 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA took the view that employees protected under group policy insurance are beneficiaries 
under a trust though they do not pay any contribution to the insurance policy. They can sue the insurance company 
but for the term which prohibits them from doing so. The question is how such trust arises. The learned judge 
merely supported his argument by relying on the “ordinary principles governing the law of trust” but did not 
provide any authority for his conclusion. The existing legal authorities seem to point to the other direction. In 
Vandepitte or Re Sinclair’s, the beneficiary named under the insurance policy failed in his or her attempt to argue 
that a trust existed. In fact, the learned judged referred to Re Schebsman48 which supports the need to prove a clear 
intention to create a trust. G R Nair was not referred to in Mohamed Salleh. In terms of the doctrine of precedent, 
the Court of Appeal is not bound by a High Court decision. But it will achieve consistency in the law if Gopal Sri 
Ram JCA had referred to G R Nair and provided more explanation to justify the different approach that he took. 
Mohamed Salleh was applied in subsequent cases.49 One such case which deserves a discussion is Mahfar 
bin Alwee v Jejaka Megah Sdn Bhd50 which applied Mohamed Salleh to a situation outside insurance cases. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
40
 (1844) 4 Hare 67. In this case, the settlor created a covenant that upon his death, his personal representatives would transfer a 
sum of money to the trustees upon trust for his surviving sons. This constituted a valid trust in favour of the surviving son. 
Accordingly, the son could enforce the covenant. 
41
 (1880) 16 Ch 290. In this case, the contract involved was an ordinary contract of guarantee created by a father to guarantee 
any losses created by his son as an underwriting member of Lloyd’s. The son was declared bankrupt and Lloyd’s was entitled 
to enforce the guarantee provided by the father to recover losses suffered by persons who dealt with his son as a trust was 
imposed and Lloyd’s was the trustee for these persons whom the guarantee was intended to benefit. 
42
 [1974] 1 MLJ 176. 
43
 [1938] Ch 799. 
44
 [1959] 2 QB 256. The facts of GR Nair were similar to Green v Russell. The case of Green v Russell was followed by Abdul 
Malek J in Anuar bin Ismail v Tan Sri Tan Chin Tuan [1992] 1 MLJ 155. 
45
 Similarly, in Kishabai v Jaikishan [1981] 2 MLJ 289 and ESPL (M) Sdn Bhd v Radio & General Engineering Sdn Bhd 
[2005] 2 MLJ 422, the High Court and the Court of Appeal respectively stated that a trust is only created if there is an intention 
to create a trust. In both cases, the court held that a trust existed as the contract between the parties involved expressly shown 
that there was an intention to create a trust. 
46
 [2000] 2 CLJ 13. 
47
 At 15 (Mohamed Salleh). 
48[1944] Ch 83. 
49
 Poominathan Kuppusamy v Besprin Stationers Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 118 and Tan Guat Lan v Aetna Univeral 
Insurance Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 CLJ  384. 
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Mahfar bin Alwee, the plaintiff purchased a house from a developer which failed to deliver the house within 24 
months as stipulated in the contract. The construction project later fell into the hands of the first defendant who 
took a project loan from the second defendant to complete construction of the houses. The plaintiff alleged that the 
first and the second defendants did not protect the plaintiff’s interest in the house as the ultimate beneficiary nor 
complete the construction of the house. It was also alleged that the second defendant had permitted the first 
defendant to commit a breach of the sale and purchase agreement. The second defendants argued that it was not 
privy to the sale and purchase agreement and cannot be sued by the plaintiffs. From this perspective, the plaintiff 
attempted to impose a burden on a third party (second defendant) to the contract. However, the plaintiff contended 
that his claim against the second defendant was based on the project loan agreement executed by the defendants 
for the plaintiff’s benefit. 
Low Hop Bing J in this case refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s action against the second defendant. The 
learned judge stated that: 
In my judgment, the factual background as alluded above does demonstrate that the second 
defendant is not a complete stranger to the housing project in which the plaintiff is one of the 
purchasers of one of the houses . . . such project . . . to revive, complete and deliver the houses to 
the purchasers, who are the ultimate beneficiaries upon completion and delivery of the houses to 
them including the plaintiff. 
The project loan agreement was undoubtedly executed for the benefit of, inter alia the plaintiff. 
It is clear to me that there is a reasonable cause of action based on an implied trust of the 
plaintiff. Support for my view may be found in the Court of Appeal judgment in Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Mohamed Salleh. (emphasis added)51 
 
Thus, it was held that the second defendant owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff to ensure completion and 
delivery of the house to him. It appears that Low Hop Bing J imposed an implied trust based on the fact that the 
project loan agreement was made for the benefit of the plaintiff. The intention of the contracting parties to create a 
trust was not discussed at all. The case did not mention the terms of the loan agreement as to whether the term 
expressly stated any benefit to the plaintiff. Without such reference, arguably, the plaintiff was an incidental 
beneficiary.52 It is difficult to argue that there was a clear intention to benefit the plaintiff specifically. 
The Court of Appeal in Ramli bin Shahdan v Motor Insurer’s Bureau of West Malaysia53 held that an 
implied trust arose from the contract between the Motor Insurer’s Bureau and the Minister of Transport to 
compensate victims of road accidents where defendants (negligent drivers) were uninsured. PS Gill JCA referred 
to Tomlinson v Gill and Gregory and Parker v William and stated that: 
Against this backdrop we can say with equanimity that when a contract as in our present 
instance is made between the first respondent and second respondent for the benefit of the 
appellants, then the second respondent can sue on the contract for the benefit of the appellants, 
and recover all that the appellants would have recovered as of the contract had been made by the 
appellant himself.54 Implicit in this proposition of ours, is the fact that if the second respondent 
fails in his duty, the appellants as beneficiaries under the implied trust, may successfully 
maintain an action against the first respondent and second respondent as joint defendants. The 
issue of locus of the appellants to sue, is for purposes of this appeal cadit quaestio.55 
 
The first query on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ramli Shahdan is in relation to the requirements to 
be satisfied in order to create an implied trust. From the above quotation by PS Gill JCA, it seems that all that is 
necessary to prove is an intention of the contracting parties to benefit the third party. There was no discussion on 
cases such as Vandepitte, Green v Russell and Re Schebsman in PS Gill JCA judgment. It is unlikely that the 
Minister of Transport in entering the contract with the Motor Insurer’s Bureau intends to create a trust for all the 
possible victims of road accident which fall within the contract. As such, it is possible to argue that the approach 
taken by PS Gill JCA is similar to the approach taken in Tomlinson v Gill. It is worthy to note that Gopal Sri Ram 
JCA who had earlier in Mohamed Salleh discussed about the strict approach (no trust will be created unless a clear 
intention to create a trust is proven) concurred with PS Gill JCA’s judgment.  
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From the cases explained above, it can be argued that the requirement of an intention to create a trust may 
be satisfied if the contracting parties intend to benefit the third party. Such cavalier approach may leads to justice 
as the intention of the contracting parties to benefit the third party is given effect to. However, such approach is 
undesirable. It is inconsistent with the general law of trust which requires more to be proven other than an 
intention to benefit the third party. Besides, the inconsistent approach adopted by the courts where in some cases, a 
stricter approach is adopted in determining the existence of an intention to create a trust leads to uncertainty and 
confusion in the law. 
 
7. Tort of Negligence 
 
If a third party suffers losses due to the promisor’s breach of contract, the former may sue the latter under the law 
of tort of negligence. In order to succeed, the third party must prove that the promisor owes a duty of care to him 
which has been breached and caused losses to him which are not too remote. The ability of the tort of negligence 
to assist the third party increases with the expansion of claims for pure economic loss which is the usual type of 
loss suffered by the third party when the promisor breaches a contract. 
In Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Steven Phoa Cheng Loon,56 the Federal Court held that pure 
economic losses are recoverable under the tort of negligence but the courts must exercise caution in extending the 
law to claims of pure economic losses. The Federal Court adopted the three stage test in Caparo Industries plc v 
Dickman57 in determining the existence of a duty of care. However, the Federal Court stated that the local courts 
must also consider s.3 Civil Law Act 1956 where adoption of the English common law must be suitable to the 
‘public policy’ and the ‘local circumstances’ to decide whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of 
care. Similarly, in Ng Wu Hong v Abraham Verghese TV Abraham,58 the High Court held that a legal action to 
recover pure economic loss in tort related to contract can be brought successfully if the various requirements of the 
tort of negligence can be satisfied.  
The major difficulty faced by a third party in relying on the tort of negligence to sue the promisor is in 
imposing a duty of care owed by the promisor. The law in relation to duty of care is constantly developing. There 
are different approaches that can be adopted by the courts in determining whether the promisor owes the third 
party a duty of care. Besides, the issue on whether a duty of care exists depends largely on the facts of each case. 
The courts may also not in favour to resort to the tort of negligence mechanism to circumvent the privity rule as 
this amounts to using tort law as a backdoor to claims prohibited by contract law. Although in recent years, there 
has been more interaction between contract law and tort law, the courts may continue to exercise caution for fear 
of eroding further the equilibrium between tort law and contract law. The tort of negligence mechanism may also 
be unsuitable in instances where there is an intentional act or omission in breaching the contract rather than 
negligence. The scope of the tort of negligence should not be strained merely to reduce the difficulties created by 
the privity rule. 
 
8. Estoppel 
 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel can be relied on to circumvent the privity rule. The doctrine of promissory 
estoppel states that a person (A) who has made a representation to another person (B) is not allowed to resile from 
his representation where B has relied on the representation to his detriment. Once A promises to forgo certain legal 
rights that he enjoys against B, A is not entitled to assert those legal rights against B.59 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel can assist a third party to claim a benefit intended for him60 by the 
contracting parties if the promisor has represented to him about the benefit. If the third party has relied on the 
representation and it is unconscionable to allow the promisor to resile from his promise, the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel will prevent the promisor from going back on his words. Thus, although the third party is not privy to the 
contract made between the promisor and the promisee, he is still entitled to enforce the benefit against the 
promisor. However, for the doctrine of promissory estoppel to effectively circumvent the privity rule, this will 
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entail the use of this doctrine to create a new cause of action for the third party where none exists before. At first 
sight, this approach goes against one of the limitations of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that it can only be 
used as a ‘shield’ and not as a ‘sword’. It must be noted that a plaintiff is entitled to utilise this doctrine but only in 
relation to the establishment of the requirements to a cause of action which he has against the defendant.61 
However, due to recent cases, it may now be possible to rely on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to create a 
cause of action for the plaintiff.  
In Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher,62 the Australian High Court has for the very first time decided 
that the doctrine can be used to create a cause of action for the plaintiff to sue the defendant. In Waltons Stores, 
Maher, the owner of a commercial property negotiated with Waltons, a retailer who was interested to lease the 
building to be built on the land which was specially suited to Waltons’ need as a retailer. Maher assumed that a 
valid contract for the lease would be created63 and demolished the existing building on the land and started 
building operations. After a few months, Waltons refused to enter into a lease agreement. Maher could not bring 
an action for breach of contract as no valid contract was created between them. Thus, Maher brought an action 
against Waltons relying on the doctrine of estoppel to prevent Waltons from denying that a valid contract was 
created. One obstacle faced by Maher was that he was relying on the doctrine to create a cause of action which did 
not exist in the first place. 
The High Court of Australia held that Maher was entitled to succeed and granted damages to him. Three of 
the five judges (Mason CJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ) held that the doctrine of estoppel can be relied on to create a 
cause of action. According to Brennan J, this would arise if: 
. . . the promisor induces the promisee to assume or expect that the promise is intended to affect 
their legal positions and he knows or intends that the promisee will act or abstain from in 
reliance on the promise, and when the promisee does so act or abstain from action and the 
promisee would suffer detriment by his action or inaction if the promisor were not to fulfil the 
promise.64 
 
Mason CJ and Wilson J (joint judgment) held that departure from the rule that estoppel doctrine is used as a shield 
is justified only if it is unconscionable to allow the representor to turn back on his promise. If this is proven, the 
doctrine can be used to enforce voluntary promises. To prove such unconscionability, the learned justices provided 
the following guideline: 
As failure to fulfil a promise does not of itself amount to unconscionable conduct, mere reliance 
on an executory promise to do something, resulting in the promisee changing his position or 
suffering detriment, does not bring promissory estoppel into play. Something more is required. 
Humphreys Estate suggests that this may be found, if at all, in the creation or encouragement by 
the party estopped in the other party of an assumption to his detriment to the knowledge of the 
first party.65 
 
Waltons had been referred to in numerous decisions in Malaysia, notably the case of Boustead Trading 
(1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd,66 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA67 had undertaken the task to 
liberalise the doctrine of promissory estoppel in Malaysia. There is a Malaysian case which had directly applied 
Waltons. In Curvet Transport SA v Shapadu Trans-System Sdn Bhd,68 the plaintiffs negotiated with the defendant 
to provide transportation services (carriage of goods by sea) to the defendant. The defendant’s group manager and 
senior manager had accepted the plaintiffs’ quotation and informed them that the contract would be awarded to 
them save for some formalities to be fulfilled. The defendant was informed that a vessel was on its way to South 
Korea to be ready for loading of the first shipment. The defendant later awarded the contract to another company 
on the reason that the plaintiffs did not meet the pre-requisite that the successful contracting party must be a 
Bumiputra company to be first registered with the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia. 
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It was held by Kamalanathan Ratnam J that there was indeed a concluded contract between the plaintiffs 
and the defendant. Alternatively, if there was no concluded contract between the parties, the defendant was clearly 
estopped and precluded from denying that there was a valid and concluded binding contract between the parties. 
The learned judge arrived at his decision by relying on Waltons (which bore similar facts to the present case) and 
observed that: 
The Waltons Stores case was cited by our Federal Court in the case of Boustead wherein Gopal 
Sri Ram JCA stated that the doctrine of estoppel had been applied in the Waltons Stores case to 
prevent a litigant from asserting that there was no valid and binding contract between him and 
his opponent and to create binding obligations where none previously existed. (emphasis added) 
69
 
In Curvet, the High Court awarded damages to the plaintiff to compensate for the plaintiff’s expectation 
loss as a result of the defendant’s breach of contract.70 Damages awarded to the second plaintiff comprised of the 
loss of commission which would be earned if there was no breach of contract by the defendant. 
In Tropical Profile Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia (Jabatan Kerja Raya),71 Low Hop Bing J held that in 
situations where no privity existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, the former can still sue the defendant if 
there are facts which raises the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This supports the contention 
that the third party can use the doctrine to create a cause of action to enforce the benefit intended for him. Some 
academics also come to this conclusion after reviewing Boustead.72  
Yet, Curvert and Tropical are merely High Court decisions. As such, the legal position in Malaysia is not 
settled and awaits further clarification from the higher courts. In the recent case of Sanmaru Overseas Marketing 
Sdn Bhd v PT Indofood International Corp,73 Abdul Malik JCA referred to Boustead and stated that: 
While the Court of Appeal in Low v Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch 82 establishes the principles that 
estoppel cannot be used as a cause of action but merely serves as a rule of evidence, the 
Australian High Court in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher and another (1988) 76 ALR 
513 goes to the extent of allowing a plaintiff to utilise estoppel as a substantive cause of action. 
The Federal Court in Boustead makes no mention of whether estoppel can constitute a 
substantive cause of action notwithstanding the fact that it cited the Waltons Stores case in its 
judgment. Lord Wright, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Canada and Dominion 
Sugar Company, Limited v Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships, Limited [1947] AC 46 
at p 55, succinctly said: 
 
      There was, perhaps, a time when estoppels were described as odious 
and as such were viewed with suspicion and reluctance. But in 
modern times the law of estoppel has developed and has become 
recognised as a beneficial branch of law. That great lawyer Sir 
Frederick Pollock has described the doctrine of estoppel as 'a simple 
and wholly untechnical   conception, perhaps the most powerful and 
flexible instrument to be found in any system of court 
jurisprudence'. (emphasis added)74 
 
Abdul Malik Ishak JCA in Sanmaru took a narrow interpretation of Boustead in relation to the issue as to 
whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel can create a new cause of action. However, it can be contended that 
the learned agreed that a more flexible approach should be taken in applying the doctrine, thereby suggesting that 
the doctrine can create a new cause of action if the facts of the case warrants such necessity. Unfortunately, the 
learned judge did not clarify the position that he took in this matter. 
It must be noted that in relation to situations where the promisor makes a promise to the third party that 
direct payment will be made to him, the High Court in Malaysian Australian Finance held that the third party can 
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enforce the contract, applying the legal position in India.75 The third party’s right is justified in the doctrine of 
estoppel.76 
Even if the third party is entitled to utilize the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce the promise 
against the promisor, there are other complications involved. Firstly, third parties may not be able to prove that the 
promisor makes a promise to them. Thus, promissory estoppel is not applicable where the third party does not 
know that a contract has been made for his benefit or where the third party knows the existence of such contract 
but no promise is made to him. Knowledge about the existence of the contract may come from the promisee who 
may even makes a promise to the third party that a contract is created for his benefit. This is likely as usually there 
is connection between the promisee and the third party which justifies the making of the contract for the latter’s 
benefit. Here, the third party has no cause of action as the promisee is not the party who breaches the promise. The 
promisor cannot be made liable through the doctrine as he has made no promise to the third party unless it could 
be argued that the promisee is acting as his agent, which is unlikely in most of the situations. Secondly, there are 
uncertainties as to the scope of unconscionability protected by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Particularly, it 
is questionable whether the courts will decide that the promisor (representor) has acted unconscionably if the third 
party does not suffer any detriment or that there is no change of position by the third party as a result of the 
promise. 
 
9. Remedies for breach of contract 
 
If the promisor breaches a contract made for the benefit of third parties, the promisee is entitled to sue him for 
breach of contract and apply to court for specific relief (specific performance and injunction). This will ensure that 
the contract is performed for the benefit of the third party. In Malaysia, specific performance and injunction are 
governed by the Specific Relief Act 1950 (Revised 1974) (Act 137) (hereinafter referred to as ‘SRA 1950’). In 
Ramli bin Shahdan v Motor Insurer’s Bureau of West Malaysia,77 the Court of Appeal unanimously held that a 
promisee is entitled to specific performance to enforce a contract made for the benefit of third parties. The 
Malaysian courts are willing to exercise their discretion where necessary to grant specific performance to do 
justice in cases that come before them.78  The injustices created by the privity doctrine to contracts made for the 
benefit of third parties will be taken into account by the courts. Although the cases deal mostly with specific 
performance, the same approach will be taken in dealing with injunction since the principles governing these two 
remedies are similar.79 
 
10. Evaluation 
 
Despite the fact that there are a number of common law mechanisms to redress the problems created by the privity 
rule, it is submitted that the existing position in Malaysia in relation to the privity rule is unsatisfactory due to the 
following reasons. The scope of each of the exception is limited and cannot apply to all contracts made for the 
benefit of third parties. The rationale of recognising third party rights is to respect the contracting parties’ 
intention. However, the common law mechanisms will not apply merely because there is an intention to benefit the 
third party. To invoke the application of any of these mechanisms, the separate set of requirements of each of the 
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mechanisms has to be satisfied.80 Due to the various requirements imposed by the common law mechanisms, the 
law discriminates between different third parties who are intended to benefit from the contract. For instance, in 
relation to some mechanisms such as collateral contract and promissory estoppel, lack of knowledge of the 
existence of the contract will defeat the application of these two mechanisms. 
In addition, the expansion of the scope of the common law mechanisms also strains the proper scope of the 
common law mechanisms and causes artificiality. Put simply, the common law mechanisms are not originally 
intended to resolve the difficulties created by the privity rule. These mechanisms are creatively manipulated by the 
courts in the given circumstances to ensure that the contracting parties’ intention and fairness are achieved. 
Uncertainty in the law will ensue as there will be guesswork done on how the courts will decide a case relating to 
contracts made for the benefit of third parties i.e., which type of mechanism will be used and the scope given to 
the mechanism. From the analysis of cases dealing with the privity rule in Malaysia, none of the cases involved 
any argument to persuade the courts to create further exceptions to the privity rule which is specially designed for 
creating third party rights based on the contracting parties’ intention. Perhaps, there is a fear of wastage of cost and 
time in bringing such arguments but the courts are not willing to make any changes to the law. Unfortunately, at 
present, there is no legislative attempt to institute any reform to the privity rule similar to that undertaken by the 
English Parliament which culminated into the enactment of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the common law mechanisms that are currently available to the Malaysian courts in their encounter 
with the privity rule are only applicable in limited situations. In a case involving a contract made for the benefit of 
third parties, the courts are still tied by the shackles of the privity rule.  Third parties will be turned away and 
prevented from enforcing contracts made for their benefit if their cases do not fall within any of the established 
common law mechanisms. The application of these mechanisms, particularly the trust mechanism, is far from 
satisfactory. From an examination of the judicial decisions in Malaysia, there is yet to be any decisions which 
create a specific exception to the privity rule as seen in Australia81 and Canada.82 Nonetheless, the best solution to 
the present difficulties caused by the privity rule is to undertake a statutory reform to allow for the creation of third 
party rights. This argument is based on two main reasons. First, the courts may be reluctant to undertake a judicial 
reform of the privity rule for fear of usurping the legislative powers of the Parliament. Secondly, even if the 
Federal Court, the highest court in Malaysia is committed to make changes to the privity rule, the opportunity to 
do so may be hard to come by as cases involving contracts made for the benefit of third parties may not reach the 
Federal Court. 
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